Reading Lessons: In elementary school when learning to read the teacher would ask each person to read a paragraph and when we finished we would discuss what we read by the teacher asking questions about the subject matter. Do the people prepare before their appearances?
Do the Congress/Committees discuss the information of each bill and understand what they are voting on or reading up on the subject matter when appearing before the Senate or Congress?
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‘You Need To Read The Paper’: When John Kennedy Grilled Biden Official Over Chip Exports To China
During a Senate Banking Committee hearing earlier this year, Senator John Kennedy grilled Assistant Secretary For Export Administration at the Department of Commerce, Thea Kendler, over Nvidia chip exports to China.
“This is an interesting day,” the former FBI counsel told MSNBC’s Nicolle Wallace during the latest episode of Deadline: White House.
“I think clearly what the former president and president-elect is doing is another shot across to send a message to those people who might sue him for wrongs,” Weissmann continued. “E. Jean Carroll obviously was the victim here, as found by not one but two juries that awarded her a sum of over 85 million dollars, and they found that she was sexually is assaulted.”
READ MORE: ‘Guardrails of the rule of law’: Why federal appeals court upheld Trump/Carroll abuse verdict
The former top prosecutor went on to explain why Trump’s appeal failed.
“And so, the claims against her by Donald Trump are unsupported by any facts, and in fact, are contrary to the jury verdicts and just legally, by the way, Donald Trump cannot re-litigate that,” Weissmann emphasizes. “He had an opportunity not once, but twice, he could have testified and didn’t, so this is a lot of fear mongering, but it is effective fear mongering, as we have seen in a variety of different contexts. It’s something to keep an eye on in terms of the courts.”
Weissmann continued, “Today’s decision is frankly quite a routine decision. There was not much of a legal issue here. The court issued an unusually long opinion, probably to make sure this case was bulletproof in terms of an appeal. It was issued per curiam — one judge wrote it. I think that also was an is the effect of Trump, so that no one judge was bearing the brunt of any repercussions. And it remains to be seen just whether the judicial system is going to hold up. But today is a good sign. It remains to be seen whether it is going to last for four more years of this.”
Andrew Weissmann Predicts ‘The former president will be prosecuted. ’ Weissmann, a former top prosecutor in the FAKE Russia investigation against President Trump/Durham Report. When will the Durham report be adjudicated – since the investigation was proved to be fake?
Explore the controversial phenomenon of companies going ‘woke’ and facing financial fallout. 🏢💸 From polarizing marketing campaigns to shifting corporate values, this video dives into why some businesses that embrace social activism struggle to maintain profits. Discover the risks, challenges, and backlash that come with aligning brands to political or cultural movements.
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Companies/executives who follow this broke trend are not looking after the company or the stock holders and should be fired when they lead a company to destroy itself. The stock holders should sue the CEO for dereliction of duty.
China has weaponized an unconventional tool for fun and profit: lawfare. This strategy, defined as the manipulation of legal systems and international norms to achieve strategic goals, has become a central pillar of China’s foreign policy. Through the calculated use of domestic and international laws, Beijing justifies its aggressive territorial claims, silences dissent, controls foreign businesses, and advances its global influence—all under the guise of legal legitimacy.
Lawfare as a Propaganda Tool
At its core, China’s lawfare strategy is not just about achieving tangible geopolitical wins; it’s also about controlling the narrative. By framing its actions as lawful responses to perceived threats or historical claims, Beijing crafts a facade of legitimacy. This narrative serves two primary audiences: its domestic population, where state media reinforces China’s righteous stance, and the international community, where Beijing aims to sow doubt and complicate diplomatic responses.
As highlighted in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) report, China’s “Legal Great Wall” is not just a collection of domestic laws but an integrated part of its broader strategy to advance its interests. The report identifies laws such as the National Security Law, Intelligence Law, and Anti-Espionage Law as critical tools that allow China to surveil foreign businesses and individuals. For example, the Counterterrorism Law mandates that telecommunications and internet companies must provide information and technical support to public organizations investigating terrorism. The Cyber Security Law and Data Security Law require foreign companies to store data in China and seek government approval before transferring certain types of data out of the country.
In the South China Sea, China’s lawfare strategy is perhaps most visible. Despite a 2016 international tribunal ruling overwhelmingly in favor of the Philippines and against China’s nine-dash line territorial claims, Beijing dismissed the verdict as “null and void.” Instead of complying, China doubled down, building artificial islands, deploying its maritime militia, and introducing new domestic laws to justify its illegal maritime activities. As the report points out, “The PRC rotates a set of layered arguments to justify maritime claims, constrain freedom of navigation for military purposes, and question the legitimacy of the existing maritime order.”
This approach isn’t limited to maritime disputes. In Hong Kong, China’s National Security Law systematically dismantled the region’s autonomy, all while Beijing framed its actions as necessary legal measures to ensure stability and national security. According to the law, the Chinese government can bypass local courts and directly prosecute individuals it perceives as a threat to national security. This legal mechanism has silenced dissent and given Beijing near-total control over Hong Kong’s governance.
Who Are the Targets?
China’s lawfare primarily targets nations and organizations that pose a geopolitical challenge or economic opportunity. In the South China Sea, smaller nations like the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia face constant harassment from China’s maritime forces. Similarly, tech giants like Apple and Microsoft operating in China must comply with stringent cybersecurity and data localization laws, allowing Beijing to control information flows and monitor foreign entities.
International organizations are also frequent targets. The World Health Organization (WHO) has faced criticism for appearing overly deferential to China during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic—a testament to China’s ability to influence global institutions through financial contributions and strategic legal interpretations. As one analyst put it, “The WHO’s deference to China is a matter of discussion in the international community.”
Even regional partnerships, such as China’s relationship with Cambodia, highlight the power of lawfare. In 2020, China and Cambodia signed a Free Trade Agreement, allowing for increased trade relations. However, this agreement also masked deeper strategic goals, such as speculation about a potential Chinese naval base in Cambodia—a move that could give China a strategic foothold in the Gulf of Thailand.
How Effective Is China’s Lawfare?
China’s lawfare strategy has seen mixed results. In some areas, such as the South China Sea, Beijing’s approach has been alarmingly effective. Artificial islands have become military fortresses, and China’s maritime militia dominates contested waters with little effective pushback.
However, on the global stage, China’s lawfare has not been universally successful. Efforts to manipulate institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have largely failed due to strong institutional safeguards. Additionally, blatant violations of international law, such as the dismissal of the South China Sea ruling, have damaged China’s reputation and triggered stronger regional alliances against Beijing.
As noted by experts, “The effectiveness and visibility of China’s lawfare strategy are intricately linked. Visible uses, while achieving some domestic control, can also provoke international pushback. Conversely, subtler efforts may yield more limited gains but face less immediate resistance or tension.”
Lawfare as a Performance for Allies and a Gaslighting Tactic
China’s lawfare isn’t just about practical outcomes; it’s also a performance for its allies and an exercise in gaslighting the global community. By framing its aggressive actions as legally justified, China signals to allies like Russia and Iran that international norms are flexible and exploitable.
At the same time, China creates confusion and doubt among nations attempting to hold it accountable. Legal jargon and convoluted arguments allow Beijing to muddy the waters, delaying diplomatic and legal responses while continuing its aggressive behavior.
How Threatening Is This to the U.S.?
China’s use of lawfare is a potent and evolving strategy that combines propaganda, strategic manipulation, and coercion under the veneer of legality. While the U.S. maintains military and economic superiority, it lags behind in recognizing and countering lawfare tactics. Unlike China, which integrates lawfare into its civil-military strategy, the U.S. lacks a coordinated response.
China’s legal maneuvers threaten U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific, undermine freedom of navigation in international waters, and set dangerous precedents for other authoritarian states. Additionally, China’s data laws pose cybersecurity risks to American companies operating in Chinese markets.
The U.S. Response: Playing Catch-Up
The U.S. is beginning to recognize the threat posed by China’s lawfare, but progress remains slow. Congress has requested briefings and reports from the Department of Defense (DoD) on adversarial lawfare tactics, but these measures fall short of addressing the scale of the problem.
Some military commands have started counter-lawfare programs, and the DoD now includes sections on China’s legal strategies in its annual reports. However, the U.S. still lacks a dedicated office or full-time personnel solely focused on countering adversary lawfare. For the U.S. and its allies, countering China’s lawfare requires more than PowerPoint briefings—it demands coordinated action, legal expertise, and a willingness to call out Beijing’s tactics on the global stage.
ACZ Editor: One again, the U.S. is engaged in a war where we are not seeing completely the battlefield. This was a characteristic of the Biden Administration, incompetence and slow reaction. Hopefully this will change with the next administration.
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kommonsentsjane 